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For two decades agriculture has been the lynchpin of every meeting of the 
world’s trade ministers. The Hong Kong ministerial conference of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in December 2005 was no different. Once again, a multilateral 
trade round is blocked by failure to agree on reform of farm trade, a traditional sector 
representing less than 10% of world merchandise trade. But the current round differs 
from earlier rounds: a number of new political coalitions have formed, unformed and 
reformed, and the role of Canada seems obscure. The usual approaches to explaining 
international economic outcomes consider political economy factors. In this paper I ask 
if institutional factors are part of the problem, or the solution. 
 
In the 1960s and 1970s the Europeans and Americans skirmished over 
agriculture within the GATT while other countries stood on the sidelines, hoping that 
there would be a transatlantic bargain, and that it would be beneficial for them. In the 
1980s, smaller exporters banded together in the Cairns Group of “fair traders in 
agriculture” to demand a place at the table in the Uruguay Round, and an important role 
was played by the de la Paix group (a north/south group that pushed for a broadly 
based agenda), and the G-10 (Brazil and India in a blocking role). A group of developing 
countries with preferential access to EC markets were concerned that they would lose 
market access, and a group of mostly African countries was concerned that 
liberalization would increase world prices of key imported food products (Croome 1995, 
113). In a harbinger of things to come, the 1988 and 1990 meetings of trade ministers 
ended prematurely when a group of Latin American countries walked out to protest slow 
progress on agriculture. Less visibly, an informal group of eight to ten of the main 
participants met regularly over dinner to find consensus amongst the various negotiating 
proposals that had been tabled (Croome 1995, 235).
1 Once a transatlantic 
understanding was reached at Blair House in 1992, the eventual multilateral deal on 
agriculture was brokered first among the four leading players in farm trade, Australia, 
the EC, Japan, and the USA.
2 
 
Press reports still include transatlantic recriminations about whether the EU or 
the USA is doing enough to make a new trade deal possible, and the Cairns Group still 
issues hortatory statements, but the stories now also refer to the differences between 
such new entities as the G-20, the G-33, the G-10, the G-11, the G-90, the ACP Group, 
and the African Group.
3 The original Quad (USA, EU, Japan and Canada) that met 
regularly at ministerial level from the end of the Tokyo Round in the 1970s through the 
lengthy Uruguay Round negotiations to the early days of the WTO has not met at 
                                            
1 The dinners hosted by a rotating chair included the original Quad plus Australia, New Zealand, Brazil, 
sometimes Switzerland (on market access but not domestic support), Finland (representing the Nordics) 
and Argentina. 
 
2 The original Quad also played an important role in 1993 in bringing the round to a conclusion. For a 
more complete story of the Uruguay Round, see (Wolfe 1998). 
 
3 For a glossary of the groups, see Annex A. For a list of all their meetings in 2005, see Annex B. 
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ministerial level since 1999. Efforts to craft a compromise take place as always in 
bilateral EU-USA meetings, but also in new cross-coalition groups such as the G-4, the 
FIPs, the G-4 plus Japan, the G-6, and the FIPs Plus.  
 
Multilateral economic negotiations are often explained by such exogenous 
factors as the identifiable economic interests of participants, or their domestic industries, 
and the general political and economic context. I ask about endogenous factors: does 
the institutional design of the organization and the negotiating process affect the 
outcome?  In common with utilitarian approaches, I think that negotiations contribute to 
transparency about actor intentions, but I also expect international organizations to 
provide a forum for the legitimation of the regime, and help in developing new 
consensual knowledge about how the system works (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986).  To 
the extent WTO institutional design reflects these three factors, do they make a 
difference to the outcome?  
 
The focus of this paper is the agriculture negotiations. I first establish the context 
by describing the evolution of the WTO negotiating process before describing the 
proliferation of small groups in the Doha round. The core of the paper is a consideration 
of factors that might explain the evolving institutional design of the negotiations. The 
penultimate section discusses the changing role of Canada. In the conclusion I 
speculate on the implications for the round, and for global governance. 
  
2.0   Process in the World Talk Organization
4 
 
The general perception of WTO negotiations is of episodic ministerials at which 
all the work is done. Agriculture negotiations at these meetings are often reported as a 
standoff between subsidizing Europeans and free-trading North Americans with long-
suffering developing country farmers on the sidelines. Close observers know that 
ministerials are the tip of an iceberg of diplomatic activity in and out of Geneva, and that 
the developing countries have been increasingly insistent on having a voice in that 
activity (Wolfe 2004). 
 
The WTO is a forum not an “actor” in itself, and it is Member-driven. Unlike the 
IMF and the World Bank, it has a tiny professional staff whose role is to serve as a 
secretariat to the dozens of WTO bodies. Background papers can be commissioned 
from the secretariat, but negotiating proposals come from members. The WTO is a 
place to talk, and the talking is done by representatives of Members, both diplomats 
based in Geneva and officials from capitals, including ministers. They talk at the 
Ministerial Conference every two years and in the Council for Trade in Services. They 
talk in regular committees that meet two or three times a year, in the negotiating groups 
that meet every 4-6 weeks, and in the Dispute Settlement Body. They talk in hundreds 
of formal on-the-record meetings every year, and they talk in many hundreds more 
informal meetings (Wolfe 2004), which is not unusual in international organizations 
                                            
4 The WTO is a successor to what The Economist once called the General Agreement to Talk and Talk, a 
good assessment of the GATT. 
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(Prantl 2005; Sureda 2003).  Most of the negotiating groups meet for a week at a time, 
but they only meet in plenary session at the beginning and the end of the week, and 
then only briefly, for transparency. The real work is done in informal meetings of the 
various small groups, or in restricted meetings organized by the chair, or in bilateral 
sessions. Some of these off-the-record meetings are held in the WTO building (e.g. so-
called Room F and Green Room meetings), but others are held in the offices of 
delegations, or in mini-ministerials in Member countries. Annex B shows how many of 
these informal meetings related to agriculture were held in 2005. The norms governing 
all this talk have been the subject of considerable reflection since the third Ministerial 
Conference in Seattle in 1999, which clearly failed in part for institutional design 
reasons. Too many Members did not know what was happening, did not feel a part of 
the process, and did not see their issues being addressed.   
 
Active procedural discussions among Geneva ambassadors were part of the 
response to Seattle.
5 Members now better understand the so-called “Green Room” 
process that involves 30 or so Members in searching for compromises in the overall 
negotiations. The secretariat is becoming more sophisticated at knowing which 
representatives of groups should be invited to participate in restricted meetings, and the 
groups themselves are better organized. Although it is impossible for an outsider to 
know who attends a Green Room meeting, we do know who attends mini-ministerials, 
and the principles are presumably similar. The members of the original Quad are always 
represented along with other leading traders, representatives of coalitions, and 
coordinators of the regional groups. These criteria are not written down, but everyone 
knows what they are (Blackhurst and Hartridge 2004: 712). It is important that everyone 
understand this process, and that it remain flexible to allow different configurations as 
the negotiating challenges shift. No group of countries should have to create negotiating 
obstacles only so that they can get a representative in the room, and no Member should 
have to block consensus because it did not know what was going on.  
 
3.0   Proliferation of Groups: Agriculture in the Doha Round 
 
The sixth ministerial meeting of the WTO in Hong Kong was an important way 
station in the current round of multilateral trade negotiations, launched at Doha, Qatar in 
2001. The mandate for the agriculture negotiations, which actually began in 2000 in 
accordance with the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, is set out in paragraph 13 of the 
Doha Development Agenda. Negotiators had hoped to agree on a negotiating 
framework by the time of the Cancún ministerial conference of 2003, but it was only 
completed in the General Council as part of the “July Framework” in 2004. Subsequent 
negotiations attempted to prepare an agreement in Hong Kong on the multilateral 
“modalities”, or how the actual negotiations on export subsidies, domestic support and 
market access will proceed.  
 
The group process has been evolving since the creation of the WTO, especially since 
the 1999 Seattle ministerial conference, and new patterns of coalition activity were in 
                                            
5 For a discussion of WTO process and how it has evolved, see (Wolfe 2004; and, Wolfe 2005a). 
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evidence at the Doha ministerial, but the 2003 Cancún ministerial was a shock because 
it seemed to mark a clear break from the conventional pattern. The agriculture 
negotiations initially continued the late Uruguay Round pattern on the assumption that 
the process used by the first chair of the agriculture negotiations, Aart de Zeuw, in the 
late 1980s was still valid. In the two years after the Doha ministerial, the then chair of 
the agriculture negotiations, Stuart Harbinson, tried to force the pace of negotiations by 
using the traditional technique of producing a chairman’s text. The Harbinson text of 
early 2003 was a negotiating disaster that forced its author from office just as de Zeuw 
and Arthur Dunkel had been forced out for similar efforts to advance the Uruguay 
Round process (Croome 1995, 238-9, 295-6). With no text on the table, the Montreal 
mini-ministerial of July 2003 asked the EU and the USA to produce a paper on 
agricultural market access.  Their paper was loudly rejected by a seemingly new 
coalition of developing countries, the G-20. The rejection appeared to be the cause of 
the collapse of the ministerial, bringing the Doha negotiations to a standstill. Less 
noticed was the emergence at that meeting of other new developing country coalitions. 
At Doha, the African Group, the ACP Group and the LDC Group had been active. In 
Cancún, those three started acting together as the G-90, in part to block discussion of 
the so-called “Singapore issues”, while new groups were active on agriculture, notably 
the G-33 and the G-10. Since Cancún, the old certainties about the structure and 
players in agriculture negotiations have been undermined.  
 
The effort to restart the Doha round after the breakdown in Cancún required 
negotiations on agriculture within a ‘non-group’ (because not like-minded) of ‘Five 
Interested Parties’ (EU, USA, Brazil, India and Australia). Having played an essential 
role, the FIPs did not meet for more than six months after the new negotiating 
framework was agreed in July 2004. Negotiators waited for a new Commission to take 
office in Europe, and for a new US trade representative to be confirmed after the 
Presidential election. The new ministers, Peter Mandelson and Rob Portman, did not 
begin to pick up the pace until March 2005, and the limited usefulness of FIPs meetings 
was quickly apparent. The EU was especially sensitive to the concerns expressed by 
Members excluded from the FIPS, perhaps because it wished to dilute the group. Since 
then, as shown in Annex B, the FIPs have met on occasion, but in recent months these 
meetings have been accompanied by meetings of an expanded group (labeled FIPs 
Plus) that notably included Canada and members of the G-10. Other groups have also 
met more frequently and there have been meetings of a so-called "new Quad" or G-4 of 
the EU, USA, Brazil and India, and then of a G-6 that adds Japan and Australia. At the 
same time as these small cross-coalition groups proliferated, mini-ministerials 
continued, and capital-based “senior officials” began to meet again.   
 
4.0   Explanations for the Elaborate Agriculture Process 
 
The process of WTO farm trade negotiations is now marked by extensive 
discussion among groups with over-lapping membership in a way not seen before. 
Three interlocking factors help illuminate, if not explain, this phenomenon: a changing 
distribution of power in its various forms, new issues on the agenda, and the evolution  
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of the negotiating modalities. I address each factor in turn. In the subsequent section I 
discuss what all these groups do.  
4.1  Whose power is determinative? 
 
The familiar story about how the USA as the new hegemon rescued the world 
trading system from autarchy after the Second World War is not wrong, but was its role 
predicated on its military strength, the size of its market, or its ability to alter the terms of 
debate? That is, did its power depend on coercion, interests, or ideas? The answer is 
obviously, some combination thereof, but it is easy enough to see the GATT of 1948 as 
a public good supplied by the USA alone. By the 1960s the GATT could be seen as a 
bilateral agreement between Europe and the United States. That model was still a good 
approximation in the Tokyo Round of the 1970s. It was clear by the start of the Uruguay 
Round in the 1980s, however, that things had begun to change, not least because of 
the creation of the Cairns Group of agricultural exporters to create enough weight to be 
able to participate as equals in the agricultural negotiations (Higgott and Cooper 1990). 
Whatever the relative weight of the factors, the key deal making the round possible was 
nevertheless the Blair House accord between the U.S. and the EU. But now old ideas of 
power are losing their ability to illuminate negotiations. 
 
Power is a problematic concept in international relations. Traditional definitions 
and the hierarchical classifications of actors associated with them are not always 
analytically helpful in the context of the WTO. For present purposes, I accept the 
definition proposed by Barnett and Duvall (2005: 3): “Power is the production, in and 
through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their 
circumstances and fate.” Two types of power are especially salient for the WTO. 
Compulsory power, they argue, “can be based on material resources, and on symbolic 
or normative resources.” (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 14-15) In addition to states, 
international organizations, firms, and civil society organizations have the means to get 
others to change their actions in a favoured direction. The concept of institutional 
power is a reminder that the diffuse social relations shaped by institutions can also 
constrain behavior: the fact of the WTO’s normative framework is not easily changed 
now, and it has powerful effects on any country that accepts the terms of debate (Adler 
and Bernstein 2005).  
 
In the standard approach, WTO rounds are said to be launched by crafting a 
package big enough to entice everyone to join the consensus, but are concluded on the 
basis of the power of the major countries (Steinberg 2002). It would be foolhardy to 
pretend that the Doha Round will end before the USA and the European Union are 
ready, but their agreement will be far from sufficient. The power to coerce, which many 
take as the ordinary meaning of the term, was used effectively by the United States and 
European Union in the final days of the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds to convince less 
powerful member states to assent to their bilateral bargains. But even the USA now 
finds that it lacks coercive power. The Doha timetable is apparently driven by the 
approaching end in 2007 of U.S. President Bush’s trade promotion authority. A deal 
without the USA would not be worth having, but this powerful country cannot force a  
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consensus where one does not exist, and it less able to influence the shape of the deal 
than it was in the past.  
 
Multilateral trade reform requires the supply of two collective goods, new rules 
and more open markets. No state can supply either of these goods alone, but the 
systemic good of an open liberal multilateral trading system does not require collective 
supply by all 149 members of the WTO. A great many developing country members can 
be free riders, as long as the non-discrimination norms are binding constraints. But how 
many Members are needed for “critical mass”? The idea of critical mass implies that the 
relevant process is of a sufficient size to be self-sustaining, whether it is a nuclear 
reaction or the wide diffusion of a social norm. Many applications in social science 
derive from Mancur Olsen’s work on the provision of collective goods. Whereas Olson’s 
work is pessimistic on the possibility of cooperation, other scholars explore the 
circumstances under which a group of sufficient size can be created to supply public 
goods (Oliver and Marwell 2001).  
 
One dimension of critical mass is material. For example, Canada and the USA in 
a proposal for sectoral negotiations on Non-agricultural Market Access (NAMA) said 
that “critical mass represents a negotiated level of participation based on the share of 
world trade that interested Members determine should be covered in order for those 
Members to be willing to reduce rates in a given sector (WTO 2005).” But how much is 
enough? A manifestation of the decline of U.S. coercive power, understood as its share 
of the global distribution of power among countries and coalitions, measured as shares 
in global or sectoral transaction flows, is the observation in The Economist (2006) that 
the output of the 32 largest emerging economies is now equal to that of the rich 
countries. China, India and Brazil are especially significant both for their current size but 
also for the implications of their growth rates. Nevertheless, as Annex C shows, only 
China has entered the ranks of the top traders, with both Brazil and India being far 
behind Canada, for now. Both the EU and the USA have double the weight of Canada 
in world agricultural trade (Annex D), but Canada’s trade is significantly larger than any 
of the other members of the FIPs. Yet neither China nor Canada is a member of the G-
6, which in early 2006 was emerging as the central coordinating group for the Doha 
round. If material power determined the relative hierarchy of members of the WTO, this 
situation would be anomalous. So why are China and Canada excluded while Australia, 
Brazil and India play leading roles?  
 
In the negotiations as a whole, critical mass implies that emerging markets that 
represent a significant share of global production and consumption should help to 
supply the systemic public good by improving access to their own market. The leading 
emerging markets have a broader role. A study of the systemic role of four emerging 
powers (China, India, Brazil and a non-WTO member, Russia) argues that these 
countries may not be powers on a scale with the USA, but they have the strength and 
desire to challenge the established order. (The four country papers are introduced in 
Hurrell 2006). Unlike other second tier states, they were on the margins of the Atlantic 
order that dominated the international organization of the second half of the twentieth 
century, and they do not necessarily accept its premises. They now have the material  
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weight to pursue a different agenda, and other developing countries accept the 
legitimacy of their leadership role. Brazil and India in particular are able to play a more 
active role in the WTO than China, whose restraint shows awareness of fears of smaller 
trading partners about its export success. 
 
The rationale for Australia and Brazil’s membership in the FIPs becomes clearer 
when the share of agriculture in a country’s exports is considered. Their role may reflect 
a combination of the salience of the issue for them and their relative share in world 
markets. India does not figure among the major exporters, and agriculture, while a 
major share of its workforce, is not a major share of its exports, but Indian participation 
increases the legitimacy of the process in the eyes of other developing countries in the 
G-33 concerned about the ability of their small farmers to withstand global competition.  
 
The traditional leading players in the WTO still deploy powerful normative 
resources in the ideological hegemony of the liberal view of the value of trade 
liberalization, the evils of protectionism and the benign character of globalization. It is 
possible that the EU and the USA could so organize the WTO as to extract all possible 
benefits for themselves, although it is not clear what those benefits might be beyond the 
mere existence of an open liberal multilateral system of trade and payments in which 
their exporters have reasonable access to the world’s markets. That they do not try to 
run the system for their exclusive benefit is obvious, however the system is assessed, 
and however unfair the system may still be for some countries. Ideas of creating a 
system that is fair to all matter a great deal (Kapstein 2005, 97). The coercive power of 
the largest markets is also limited now by equally powerful normative claims based on 
justice for developing countries, in general but especially for the poorest. As Alain Noel 
shows, in recent years the discursive use of “poverty” has been changing (Noël 2005). 
After the Cold War, poverty replaced “east/west” or “north/south” as a way to frame 
left/right debate. Such normative change can alter the balance of power if claims on 
behalf of poverty have weight in negotiations. Public recognition of the G-6 signals 
acceptance of a changing configuration of world politics, giving developing countries 
confidence that they are at the heart of the process.  
 
Their growing awareness of their institutional power reinforces that centrality. 
Two norms of the trade regime – the Single Undertaking and consensus decision-
making – create specific opportunities for relatively weak states to use institutional 
power effectively. An example is the power to block consensus, used effectively by Latin 
American countries during the Uruguay Round and by the G-20 group of developing 
countries at the Cancún Ministerial. Another example is the power to influence the 
negotiating mandate of the round, used effectively by members of the Cairns Group of 
agricultural exporters in the lead up to the Uruguay Round.   
 
4.2  Changing issues 
 
In the aftermath of the Uruguay Round, countries whose agriculture is dominated 
by small-scale farmers oriented to domestic production discovered that they have a 
different interest in trade reform than do those countries whose farmers operate at large  
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commercial scale oriented to world markets. As Members began thinking about how to 
frame the Doha negotiations, many developing countries argued that “food security” 
should be a legitimate reason to undertake lesser liberalization obligations in any new 
deal. The concepts became more sophisticated when with NGO help many developing 
countries began to promote a “development box” as an alternative to the Green Box in 
the Uruguay Round agriculture agreement that was said to only benefit rich countries. 
By Cancún, the idea of “special products” had taken hold.  
 
At the same time, some of the rich countries whose small-scale highly protected 
farmers feared further liberalization began to promote the idea that some products are 
too “sensitive” for real reform. And then producers of cotton and bananas realized that a 
simple formula approach to tariff reduction would not necessarily advance their 
interests. Sugar producers dependent on preferential access to the EU market worried 
that they could be wiped out by real liberalization of the EU subsidy regime. Countries 
that are net food importers were not at all in favour of an end to subsidized exports from 
rich countries, which has given them food at below market prices. As Members became 
aware of this growing complexity, in part through discussion in existing groups, they 
reconsidered their allies, which led to the formation of new groups, and to the 
participation of many countries in more than one group.
6 
 
4.3 The effect of modalities on institutional design  
 
The proliferation of small groups is also due to change in how the negotiations 
are conducted. Tools of public action structure relations among actors (Salamon 2002). 
It follows that negotiating modalities have institutional design implications. 
 
During the Kennedy Round of the 1960s, GATT Contracting Parties developed a 
number of informal negotiating devices. One was the practice of negotiating market 
access bilaterally on a “request and offer” basis among “principal suppliers” and then 
extending the results to all participants through the “most favoured nation” principle 
(MFN). This process limits the interest of Members with large markets in negotiations 
with small market Members. Deals negotiated with "principal suppliers" do benefit small 
Members, who can act as free riders, but the practice also hurts them by limiting their 
ability to negotiate on subjects of greatest interest to them. Given the large difference in 
economic weights of participants, some major deals began life in small meetings of the 
most significant participants—the so-called “bridge club” of the US, the EEC, the United 
Kingdom, Japan, and Canada. Even then, delegates from smaller Contracting Parties 
felt excluded (Winham 1986). Trade rules and domestic policies began to come to the 
fore in the Tokyo Round, but the decision-making structure was still “pyramidal” 
(Winham 1992), with the largest players still negotiating agreements among 
themselves, then discussing the results with others. This “minilateral” process 
                                            
6  Two factors not addressed in this paper are also salient. First, over the past 25 years, developing 
countries have learned that trade and their participation in the trading system matter for them. Second, 
they have learned that the rules of the trading system matter for them, although officials and analysts are 
often misled by the apparent strengthening of the WTO’s dispute settlement system (Wolfe 2005b).  
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conserves negotiating energy, but makes it impossible for smaller countries to influence 
the results. Not surprisingly, therefore, most developing countries did not sign the 
minilateral “codes” that came out of the Tokyo Round. The Tokyo Round agricultural 
negotiations were effectively bilateral, which might be one reason that aspect of the 
Tokyo Round was a failure. In consequence of increasing substantive and geographic 
scope, the Uruguay Round agriculture negotiations were formula-based: negotiations on 
thousands of individual tariff lines with two or three dozen significant trading partners 
was not feasible.  
 
Many of the Uruguay Round agreements were explicitly designed as new 
understandings of GATT rules, for example on subsidies. These aspects of trade 
negotiations are inherently multilateral. Once a domestic policy is changed to meet 
trade obligations, all trading partners can take advantage of the new rules, so bilateral 
negotiations on rules issues are rarely successful. Negotiations on a multilateral tariff-
reduction formula, or on multilateral subsidy rules, create something on which any 
Member can have influence because agreement is subject to consensus, unlike a 
bilateral request and offer bargain. Blocking consensus alone is relatively easy, in 
principle, but shaping an outcome requires allies. In the Uruguay Round, large numbers 
of developing countries thought that they could safely ignore some new rules because 
of the many Special and Differential treatment provisions in the agreements. They were 
shocked by the difficulty of adapting to the new rules. In the Doha Round, they organize 
to make sure that their interests are protected.  
 
In sum, the negotiating process evolved to accommodate a changing 
configuration of power, more complex issues, and new modalities. Power is still highly 
salient for understanding the institutional design of multilateral trade negotiations, but 
analysts need a subtle conception of its dimensions if we are to understand who has it, 
how it changes, and how much critical mass is needed for any aspect of the negotiating 
process. Most important, these changes are endogenous: the objective interests of the 
actors have not changed nearly as much as their understanding of their interests, but 
institutional changes affect how countries organize themselves to participate in 
negotiations. An organization with 149 Members requires small groups. Their 
overlapping interests means each Member will participate in multiple groups (including 
different groups in other sectors of the round).  
 
5.0   Coalitions and Learning:  Lessons from Small Group Theory 
 
The proliferation of small groups in the WTO is relatively new, but should not be 
surprising. n any organization of 149 members, but especially in the WTO where the 
negotiating agenda is very broad and members vary greatly in terms of the expertise 
and material resources they devote to negotiations, plenary discussions are an 
inefficient means of negotiation. Small group meetings, an example of the traditional 
“expanding-and-contracting-concentric-circles” approach, are an attempt to find a 
legitimate middle ground between negotiating efficiency and effectiveness. The Green 
Room is a large group for a negotiation, but all key players plus all groups are 
represented, ensuring that it is transparent, legitimate and effective. Members in the  
  10
Green Room need to be sure that they hear all views, and their discussions have to be 
faithfully reported to all interested members in what some negotiators refer to as a 
transmission belt. One obvious benefit from all the new groupings therefore is that 
Members can work together to share information, develop positions and proposals, and 
decide who should be in the Green Room. 
 
Since the WTO does not have a formal constituency system, even for electoral 
purposes (that is, groups of countries whose main purpose is to elect a representative 
to sit on a committee, as in the UN system. See Walker 2004), groups have formed on 
an ad hoc basis. These groups coordinate among Geneva ambassadors, and they have 
ministerial meetings. The small groups relevant to the agriculture negotiations come in 
many varieties (see Table 1).
7 It has been conventional to refer to groups as 
“coalitions”, but I am using the term “groupings” here. Hamilton and Whalley (1989) 
distinguish between groupings created to move the agenda, make proposals, block 
others, and negotiate. Most groupings can do any or all of these things, but some 
characteristics make a group (or coalition) better suited to one or the other. Some of the 
developing country groupings are based on common characteristics, such as regional 
groups. By working together, these countries can share technical expertise, they can 
aggregate such market power as they possess, and they can use their collective moral 
authority to insist on recognition of their concerns. Other groupings are organized on an 
issue-specific basis, such as the Cairns Group. Such groupings can pursue either an 
offensive or defensive agenda, meaning that they seek improvements in their market 
access position abroad, or seek to minimize the disruptions for their own farmers. The 
effectiveness of these groups was obvious in Cancún, although the disparate basis of 
the geographic and sectoral groupings made it easier to oppose than propose. Many 
groups are essentially homogenous, but some groups are heterogenous, because they 
cross groupings. Finally one type of closely related small group meeting plays an 
essentially  managerial role in attempting to build packages that cross the various 
negotiating areas of the round, including trade in goods and services as well as 
agriculture. 
 
                                            
7 For a discussion that separates such developing country groupings into formal groups or alliances, 
informal issue-based groups, and “grand alliance” inter-group alliances, see (Bernal, et al. 2004, 12ff). On 
WTO coalitions, see also (Drahos 2003; Draper and Sally 2005; Narlikar 2003). 
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     Table 1:  Small Groups Relevant to Agriculture  
Regional groups (S/S)  Cross-coalition 
ACP G-4 
African Group  FIPs 
LDCs G-6 
G-90 FIPs  Plus 
  
Offensive Coalitions  Managerial for a 
C-4 Mini-ministerials 
G-11 Green  Room 
Cairns Group (N/S)  “senior officials” 
G-20 (S/S)   
  






Are all these groups best described as “coalitions”? Odell and his colleagues in a 
new book on developing countries in the WTO define a coalition  as “a set of 
governments that defend a common position in a negotiation by explicit coordination. 
We do not include in this category … a set of delegations that exchange information and 
meet to seek compromises but do not defend a common position (Odell 2006).” This 
framework sees coalitions as homogenous, which would seem to leave out cross-
coalition heterogeneous small groups. In small group theory, which is based on the 
assumption that small groups naturally emerge in any social arrangement, groups of 
individuals (and presumably of diplomatic representatives) can be homogenous or 
heterogeneous. Similarity in skills, background and other attributes can facilitate the 
work, but if the task requires exploring new ideas, then diversity is a virtue (Rubin and 
Swap 1994: 135). Homogenous coalitions therefore have a role, but heterogenous or 
cross-coalition groups may be essential for finding a consensus. Although a group 
whose members are heterogenous is less likely to reach agreement than a more 
homogenous group, if and when agreement is reached, it is more likely to be 
persuasive.   
 
The usual assumption is that coalitions defend an interest-based position, but 
they could also offer opportunities for learning by their participants. Cross-coalition 
groups might be especially important, since learning cannot occur unless the dominant 
coalition changes to include those former antagonists who play a central role in the 
problems that confront the membership (Haas 1990: 128). The G-6, it follows, is not a 
coalition—the Members do not have a common interest in finding some basis for 
compromise with other groups, but they are the principal antagonists. Rubin and Swap 
conclude (1994, 147), with specific reference to the Uruguay Round, that “most of the 
work in multilateral exchanges does not involve negotiation at all. […] It is not the 
staking out of positions, from which concessions are subsequently made, that best  
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characterizes the work that takes place in multilateral encounters. Building group 
consensus, through the dynamics of group process, is the key feature.”  
 
When we look at other negotiating areas where the new dynamic is less evolved, 
Ricardo Melendez Ortiz and his colleagues at the International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development (ICTSD) in Geneva suggest that many of the new groupings 
cannot be thought of as negotiating groups at all. Such entities as the NAMA-11, or the 
Friends of Ambition in NAMA clearly work together, but they do not meet at ministerial 
level (yet), do not necessarily adopt common positions in the negotiations, and do not 
even see themselves as a “group”, let alone as a “coalition”. More work is needed to 
refine the typology of groupings, and to consider whether the relative informality of 
fluidity of the groupings in NAMA or services as compared to agriculture makes a 
difference to the negotiations. 
 
6.0   Where is Canada? 
 
Many observers have noticed Canada’s absence from the most prominent small 
groups, such as the G-6. Why has this happened, and has Canada lost important 
influence? It should first be stressed that while the eclipse of the original Quad is new, 
Canada’s role has not changed since the end of the Uruguay Round when Australia, not 
Canada, was engaged in the final bargaining on agriculture. Factors to consider in 
understanding this reality include the country’s credibility, relative power, and 
contribution to legitimation of the changed WTO process. 
 
The lack of clarity in Canada’s agriculture position in its awkward balance 
between export-oriented and supply managed sectors has affected the country’s place 
in trade negotiations since early in the Uruguay Round.  Nevertheless, over the past 
couple of years, and probably until the end of this round, ministers and officials might be 
just as happy to fly below the radar during a minority parliament, given the intense 
scrutiny they face from Canadian farm organizations both at home and at international 
meetings. Bizarre resolutions in the House of Commons that call for increased market 
access abroad while offering none in Canada (Canada 2005b, 9960, 10017) do not help 
Canadian credibility, but also do not further diminish Canada’s role. 
 
Although not a member of the G-6, Canada is still a participant in the key 
negotiation forum, the Green Room and the mini-ministerials. It is included in the FIPs 
Plus and plays a leading role in informal meetings of senior officials. If material power 
determined the relative hierarchy, this absence from the G-6 would be anomalous, as 
discussed in section 3.1 above. But other forms of power are also salient, and might 
provide more analytic leverage. 
 
Canada may be absent from the smallest cross-coalition groups because they 
must include the principal antagonists, if a consensus is to be found. It is noteworthy 
that in an assessment of progress in the negotiations, American politicians observed 
that “we're delighted by the fact that Brazil and the EU are both working together to try 
to figure out a way to allow Brazil leading the G20 countries to agree to reducing  
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barriers on manufactured products in exchange for the European Union agreeing to 
reduce barriers on agricultural products.” (USDA 2006) Brazil and India have made 
themselves part of the problem, this time, and so they have to be part of the solution. 
Canada, it seems to me, is not a large problem for most WTO Members. It would follow 
that Canada is not needed in the smallest groups. Canada does have to be kept closely 
associated with the process, however, because as one of the largest traders Canada 
will have to make a contribution to the outcome—negotiators need to feel that the pain 
of farm trade reform is shared equally. 
 
Can Canada without its old role in the Quad still influence the outcome on 
agriculture? I accept the assessment of officials, who argue that “Canada is widely 
respected as one of the most active and influential players in the negotiations. The 
source of our strength has been our ability to bring practical, creative, and credible 
ideas to the table to build bridges and to move issues forward. Looking ahead, our 
ability to influence the negotiations will continue to be directly related to our ability to 
generate constructive ideas, and to work on building consensus around ideas that 
ultimately help to advance our own negotiating objectives.” (Canada 2005a) Officials 
observe that many aspects of the Hong Kong text, notably the language on state trading 
and the sections on a safe box for food aid, modalities for sensitive products, and tiers 
for domestic support, began as Canadian ideas, and reflect Canadian objectives. 
 
7.0   Conclusion: The Significance of the Process 
 
Agriculture negotiations are different now. The EC and USA dominated the 
Tokyo Round process, and the agriculture modality was bilateral bargaining. In the pre-
Uruguay Round period, the Cairns Group mobilized to ensure its members would have 
a voice, a particular Australian concern after their minister was left out of the key 
meetings during the 1982 GATT ministerial. During the early stages of the Uruguay 
Round, the new domestic dimension of trade policy needed new ideas, which created 
an opening for policy entrepreneurs. In the process of learning, frequent informal 
dinners among the lead negotiators were invaluable, though most participants were 
from OECD countries, except for Brazil. Now in the Doha round, groups have 
proliferated, for at least three reasons. 
 
First, the growing number of Members, each of whom has the institutional power 
to block consensus, created the need for the leading Members to meet in small groups 
to manage the process. Second, the WTO unlike the GATT is a “Single Undertaking”, 
which means Members can accept the entire package, or nothing. Members have 
gradually understood the implication, that all aspects of the system are connected: in 
the Doha Round, Members are highly conscious of the interaction between negotiations 
on goods, agriculture, services, and rules. In this inherently multilateral process it is 
easier for small states to aggregate their material power in coalitions than to work alone. 
Power and learning are not opposed concepts: the ability to make ideas effective 
depends on power, but changing modalities mean different forms of power can be 
salient. Third, the most significant change might be in the modalities for the 
negotiations. Multilateral modalities such as formula approaches to tariff rate reductions  
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or new rules for domestic support provide more opportunities to block consensus than 
bilateral modalities such as “request and offer”. But these modalities also require a high 
level of engagement and negotiating resources because the agreed formulae or rules 
usually require domestic regulatory changes by Members and, once agreed by all, apply 
to all. As trade policy moves behind the border, voice becomes more important, and it 
becomes all the more important as exit becomes less plausible for any country. 
 
The complex pattern of meetings shown in Annex B is directed to a simple goal, 
finding a consensus on a deal to reform global farm trade as part of a Single 
Undertaking package for the WTO Doha round as a whole. But that goal is anything but 
simple, because the deal must accommodate the interests of large commercial farmers 
in Europe and Brazil with those of small rice farmers in the Philippines and dairy farmers 
in eastern Canada. The current process has emerged as a means to help everybody 
learn about the issues and the technical complexities of the possible solutions. At its 
periphery it includes consultations on the issues with farm organizations. At its core are 
discussions among a small group of Members on the elements of a compromise. In 
Hong Kong, delegations were happy with the so-called “bottom up” process (inputs 
coming directly from members rather than from above), but the challenge in 2006 is 
moving to a “text-based” process. Will the Members in the small groups, like the Green 
Room, be able to explain to those they represent the basis for the text that emerges, 
and will it be seen to be a legitimate compromise?  
 
The agriculture process evolved to accommodate changing configurations of 
power, more complex issues, and new modalities. The WTO will always face the 
institutional design task of providing a forum for all 149 Members to understand the 
intentions of all other Members (transparency), and to learn about complex new issues 
(new consensual knowledge for the public and officials), a forum where all Members 
have a voice (legitimation). The challenge is squaring the circle of the formal equality of 
members, and their practical inequality in capacity to participate in negotiations or 
contribute to the outcome. The evolving process for farm trade negotiations may provide 
a model. If agriculture is able to contribute to a successful Doha outcome, this new 
process, however complex and cumbersome, will have proved its worth, and may 
suggest new avenues for future research on the contribution of institutional design, in 
contrast to the usual political economy approaches to explaining international economic 
outcomes. And if the round fails, the evolving process may still prove its worth. The 
lessons GATT Contracting Parties learned in the Tokyo Round on how to negotiate 
domestic issues only paid off in the Uruguay Round. The lessons now being learned in 
the Doha round on how to ensure all Members of the WTO are part of the process may 
also pay off only in a subsequent round.
8 
 
                                            
8 This idea was suggested by Gilbert Winham during a panel at the International Studies Association 
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Annex A: Glossary of WTO Groups Relevant to Agriculture 
Name (date 
formed) 
Description  Membership 
ACP  Group of 77 African, 
Caribbean and Pacific 
countries (56 WTO 
members) with 
preferential trading 
relations with the EU 
Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Benin, 
Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican 
Republic, Fiji, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, 
Rwanda, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, South 
Africa, Suriname, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
African Group  Holds joint positions in 
many negotiating 
issues. 
All African Union countries who are also WTO members, 
currently 41 countries. 
Cairns Group 
(1986) 





Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, 
Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and 
Uruguay. 
C-4 (2003)  “Cotton Four” group of 
countries with specific 
interest in cotton 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali. 
FIPs (2004)  Five interested parties  Australia, Brazil, EU, India, USA 
FIPs plus (2005)  FIPs plus friends  FIPs plus Argentina, Canada, China, Japan, New Zealand, 
Switzerland. 
G-4 (2005)    FIPs less Australia 
G-4 plus Japan 
(2005) 
  G-4 plus Japan 
G-6 (2005)    FIPs plus Japan 
G-10 (2003)  Importers. Multi-
functionality of 
agriculture and need 
for high levels of 
domestic support and 
protection 
Chinese Taipei, Rep of Korea, Iceland, Israel, Japan, 
Liechtenstein, Mauritius, Norway and Switzerland. 
G-11 (2005)  Full liberalization in 
tropical products 
Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Peru, Nicaragua, and 
Venezuela. 
G-20 (2003)  Elimination of export 
subsidies and 
domestic support and 
liberalization of market 
access in agriculture 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Cuba, Egypt, 
Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Tanzania, 
Uruguay, Venezuela, Zimbabwe. 





on basis of food 
security, sustainable 
livelihoods and rural 
development needs - 




Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Botswana, 
China, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, DAntigua and Barbuda, 
Barbados, Belize, Benin, Botswana, China, Congo, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, 
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Rep. Korea, 
Mauritius, Madagascar, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, St Kitts and 
Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Sri 
Lanka, Suriname, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, 
Uganda, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  
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G-90 (2003)  Coalition of African, 
ACP and least-
developed countries 
(currently 64 members 
of the WTO) 
African Group, ACP and LDCs 
Mini-ministerial  Regular participants at 
mini-ministerials in 
2005. (For an analysis 
of the principles of 
selection, see Wolfe, 
2004.) 
Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Benin, Brazil, Canada, 
Chile, China, Costa Rica, Egypt, EU, Hong Kong (China), 
India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Rwanda, 
Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland, Thailand, USA and 
Zambia. 
LDCs  Least developed 
countries according to 
the UN definition 
(currently 32 
members) 
Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea 
Bissau, Haiti, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Tanzania, Togo, 
Uganda, and Zambia. 
Quint (1989)    Australia, Canada, EU, Japan, and USA. 
RAMs  Recently acceded 
members 
Albania, Croatia, Georgia, Jordan, Moldova and Oman. 
Senior officials  Regular participants at 
meetings of senior 
officials in 2005.  
Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Egypt, Hong Kong (China), 
India, Japan, Kenya, Malaysia, South Africa, USA, and 
Zambia. 
Senior officials  New group in 2006  G-6 (Australia, Brazil, EU, India, Japan, USA)  plus Canada, 
Egypt, Malaysia and Norway 
SVEs (2003)  Small and vulnerable 
economies 
Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Cuba, 
Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Grenada, 
Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mauritius, Mongolia, 
Nicaragua, Paraguay, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, 
St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 




Annex B: Informal Meetings Related to WTO Agriculture in 2005 
Meetings of WTO agriculture-related coalitions (offensive and defensive) are listed in 
the rightmost column. Non-WTO meetings are listed in the middle column and cross-
coalition meetings are listed in the second column from the left. “Agriculture Week” 
negotiating sessions are noted in the second column as well. 
Date & Location  Meeting 
  Cross-coalition  Non-WTO  WTO Coalition 
14 Dec, Hong 
Kong 
    Small, Vulnerable 
Economies Ministerial 
14 Dec, Hong 
Kong 
   G-33  Ministerial 
14 Dec, Hong 
Kong 
    Cairns Group Ministerial 






13 Dec, Hong 
Kong 
    G-10 Ministerial 
2-3 Dec, London    G-7 Finance Ministers   
2-3 Dec, Geneva  G-4 plus Japan meeting     
30 Nov, Brussels     G-90  Ministerial 
29 Nov, Brussels      ACP Ministerial 
23-24 Nov, Arusha    African Union 2
nd 
Extraordinary Session of 
the Conference of 
Ministers of Trade 
 
22 Nov, Geneva  Agriculture negotiations 
Chair’s informal “clinic” 
(for exchanging 
information) 
   
22 Nov, Geneva  G-4 plus Japan meeting    
20 Nov, Geneva  FIPs plus friends meeting     
15-16 Nov, Busan    17
th APEC Ministerial   
12-13 Nov, Dhaka    13
th SAARC Summit   
11 Nov, Geneva  Agriculture  negotiations 




9 Nov, Geneva      G-20 ministerial 
8-9 Nov, Geneva  Geneva mini-ministerial     
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7-9 Nov, Geneva  FIPs meeting     
7 Nov, London  G-4 plus Japan meeting    
7 Nov, Geneva  Agriculture negotiations 
Chair’s informal “clinic” 
(for exchanging 
information) 
   
31 Oct, Geneva  Agriculture  negotiations 




27 Oct, Cairo      Nine African Members 
(Egypt, Kenya, Mauritius, 
Rwanda, Senegal, South 
Africa, Tunisia, Zambia, 
and Zimbabwe.) 
21 Oct, Geneva     G-20  meeting 
20 Oct, Geneva  FIPs plus friends meeting     
19 Oct, Geneva  FIPs meeting    
14, 18 and 21 Oct, 
Geneva 
Agriculture negotiations 
Chair’s informal “clinic” 
(for exchanging 
information) 
   
12 Oct, Geneva  FIPs plus friends meeting   
12 Oct, Geneva  FIPs meeting     
12 Oct, Geneva  G-4 meeting    
11-12 Oct, Geneva      G-20 ministerial 
10 Oct, Zurich  Zurich mini-ministerial    
9-10 Oct, Zurich  Senior officials meeting 
(host USA)     
30 Sep, 4, and 7 
Oct, Geneva 
Agriculture negotiations 




29-30 Sep, Geneva  Senior officials meeting 
(host Japan)     
24 Sep, Paris  FIPs plus friends meeting    
23 Sep, Paris  FIPs meeting     
23 Sep, Paris  G-4 meeting    
13-16 Sep, Geneva  Special Session of the 
Committee on Agriculture      
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9-10 Sep, Bhurban     G-20  meeting 
19-20 Aug, 
Sanctuary Cove 
6th Quint ministerial     
26 July, Geneva  Consultations  between 
the Chair and Heads of 
Delegation to the 
agriculture negotiations 
  
18-20 Jul, Dakar    African Growth and 
Opportunity Act Forum 
 
11-12 Jul, Dalian  China mini-ministerial    
8 Jul, Gleneagles    G-8 Summit   
7 Jul, San José      Latin American Banana 
Exporters 
4-6 Jul, Geneva  Special Session of the 
Committee on Agriculture     





4 Jul, Geneva  FIPs plus friends     
27 Jun, Livingstone     LDC  meeting 
20-21 Jun, Geneva  Senior officials meeting 
(host EU)     
14-15 Jun, Paris    OECD Agriculture 
Committee (also attended 
by Brazil, China, South 
Africa) 
 
11-12 Jun, Jakarta      G-33 ministerial 
8 Jun, Cairo    Third African Union 
Conference of Ministers 
of Trade 
 
2-3 Jun, Jeju    APEC Trade Ministers   
30 May-5 June, 
Geneva 
Special Session of the 
Committee on Agriculture    
4  May, Paris  FIPs meeting     
2-4 May, Paris  Paris mini-ministerial    
2 May, Paris      G-10 Ministerial 
18-19 Apr, Geneva  Senior  officials  meeting 
(host Canada) 
 
(This one had broader 
participation than others 
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— a mini-ministerial at 
senior official level.) 
13-19 Apr, Geneva  Special Session of the 
Committee on Agriculture     
1 Apr, Cartegena      27th Cairns Group 
ministerial 
18-20 Mar, New 
Delhi 
    G-20 Ministerial 
14-18  Mar,  Geneva  Special Session of the 
Committee on Agriculture    
2-4 Mar, Mombasa  Kenya Mini-Ministerial     
25 Feb, Geneva  Agriculture  consultations 
with the Chair of the 
negotiations 
  
12 Feb, Geneva  Senior officials meeting 
(host USA)     
7-11  Feb,  Geneva  Special Session of the 
Committee on Agriculture    
3-4 Feb, Dakar    Dakar Agricole Forum 
(Meeting about 
agriculture organized by 
Senegal; included 
ministers from Canada, 
US, France, India, etc) 





29 Jan, Davos  Davos mini-ministerial     
29 Jan, Davos      G-20 meeting in advance 
of World Economic Forum 




Annex C: Leading Exporters and Importers in World Merchandise 
Trade (excluding intra-EU (25) trade), 2004 
(Billion dollars and percentage) 
     Exporters  Value  Share      Importers  Value  Share 
1  Extra-EU (25) exports  1203.8  18.1    1  United States  1525.5 21.8 
2  United States  818.8  12.3    2  Extra-EU (25) imports  1280.6 18.3 
3  China  593.3 8.9   3  China  561.2 8.0 
4  Japan  565.8 8.5   4  Japan  454.5 6.5 
5  Canada  316.5 4.8   5  Canada  279.8 4.0 
6  Hong Kong, China  265.5  4.0    6  Hong Kong, China  272.9  3.9 
  domestic exports  20.0  0.3            retained imports  27.3  0.4 
  re-exports  245.6  3.7    7  Korea, Republic of  224.5  3.2 
7  Korea, Republic of  253.8  3.8    8  Mexico  206.4  3.0 
8  Mexico  189.1 2.8   9  Taipei,  Chinese  168.4 2.4 
9  Russian  Federation  183.5 2.8   10  Singapore  163.9 2.3 
10  Taipei, Chinese  182.4  2.7            retained imports    82.8  1.2 
11 Singapore  179.6  2.7    11 Switzerland  111.6  1.6 
 domestic  exports  98.6  1.5   12  Australia  109.4 1.6 
 re-exports  81.0  1.2   13  Malaysia  105.3 1.5 
12 Malaysia  126.5  1.9    14  Turkey  97.5  1.4 
13 Saudi  Arabia  126.2  1.9    15  India  97.3  1.4 
14  Switzerland  118.5  1.8    16  Russian Federation    96.3  1.4 
15  Thailand  97.4 1.5   17  Thailand  95.4 1.4 
16  Brazil  96.5 1.5   18  Brazil  65.9 0.9 
17  Australia  86.4  1.3    19  South Africa    57.1  0.8 
18  United Arab Emirates  82.8  1.2    20  Indonesia  54.9  0.8 
19 Norway  81.8  1.2           
20 India  75.6  1.1           
 




Annex D: Exports of Agricultural Products of Selected Economies, 
2004 
  Rank by Value  
(million dollars)   
Rank by % share in economy's 
merchandise exports   
1.  United States  79567  1. New Zealand  59.7 
2.  extra-EU (25) exports  78410  2. Argentina  49.6 
3. Canada  40100  3. Brazil  32.0 
4. Brazil  30853  4. Australia  22.8 
5. China  24121  5. Canada  12.7 
6. Australia  22101  6. India    11.6 
7.  Argentina 17082  7. United States  9.7 
8.  New Zealand  12157  8. South Africa  7.9 
9.  Mexico    11358  9. extra-EU (25) exports  6.5 
10.  India    8964  10. Mexico  6.0 
11. Japan  5468  11. China 4.1 
12.  Korea, Republic of  4984  12. Korea, Republic of  2.0 
13. South  Africa  3619  13. Japan  1.0 
 
Source WTO, (2005) International Trade Statistics, 2005 (Geneva: World Trade Organization). 
Table I.9 
 